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Abstract Uncertainty pervades most aspects of life. From selecting a new technology
to choosing a career, decision makers rarely know in advance the exact outcomes of
their decisions. Whereas the consequences of decisions in standard decision theory are
explicitly described (the decision from description (DFD) paradigm), the consequences
of decisions in the recent decision from experience (DFE) paradigm are learned from
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experience. In DFD, decision makers typically overrespond to rare events. That is, rare
events have more impact on decisions than their objective probabilities warrant
(overweighting). In DFE, decision makers typically exhibit the opposite pattern,
underresponding to rare events. That is, rare events may have less impact on decisions
than their objective probabilities warrant (underweighting). In extreme cases, rare
events are completely neglected, a pattern known as the “Black Swan effect.” This
contrast between DFD and DFE is known as a description–experience gap. In this
paper, we discuss several tentative interpretations arising from our interdisciplinary
examination of this gap. First, while a source of underweighting of rare events in DFE
may be sampling error, we observe that a robust description–experience gap remains
when these factors are not at play. Second, the residual description–experience gap is
not only about experience per se but also about the way in which information
concerning the probability distribution over the outcomes is learned in DFE.
Econometric error theories may reveal that different assumed error structures in DFD
and DFE also contribute to the gap.
Keywords Black swans . Risk . Ambiguity . Fourfold pattern . (Non)-expected utility .
Probabilistic choices . Experience-based decisionmaking . Description-based decision
making
1 Introduction
In the standard (decision from description (DFD)) approach to studying decision under
uncertainty, participants are presented with choices between prospects that are de-
scribed as event-contingent outcomes (e.g., lose $50 with probability 0.5, and nothing
otherwise; gain $100 if the home team wins and nothing otherwise). The decision
maker is either provided with precise objective probabilities (risk) or natural events for
which vague subjective probabilities may be assigned (ambiguity). Most of the accu-
mulated empirical findings can be summarized with the assertion of a robust tendency
for people to overweight low probabilities and unlikely events and to underweight
moderate to high probabilities and likely events (Tversky and Kahneman 1992;
Tversky and Fox 1995; Fox and Tversky 1998; Wakker 2010).
In the last decade, behavioral decision researchers introduced a new decision from
experience (DFE) paradigm in which characteristics of prospects are learned from
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experience rather than explicitly described. In this case, both probabilities and outcomes are
learned through sequential sampling, that is, through repeated draws with replacement from
a probability distribution over outcomes that are unknown to the decision maker (Hertwig
et al. 2004). The dominant finding then is that decision makers underrespond to rare events,
contrary to the typical pattern observed in DFD (Barron and Erev 2003; Hertwig et al.
2004). Taleb (2007) refers to an extreme case, in which the possibility of rare events is
ignored (due to an inaccurate mental model of the uncertain environment) as the “Black
Swan effect.” The contrast between decisions from description and decisions from experi-
ence is usually referred to as the “description–experience gap” (Hertwig and Erev 2009).
This paper critically examines the description–experience gap. We first take stock of
prior contributions in the literature. Second, we propose econometric tools to analyze
errors and heterogeneity, which can shed light on the DFD-DFE gap. Third, we link the
literature on DFE with recent empirical literature on DFD under ambiguity (Dimmock
et al. 2013).
2 Risk and ambiguity in prospect theory
In standard decision under uncertainty, an alternative, or prospect, is described by a list
of event-contingent outcomes. To illustrate, let xEy denote the prospect that pays $x if
event E obtains, and $y otherwise. For instance, setting x=10, y=1, and E = “rain
tomorrow,” 10E1 denotes a prospect yielding $10 if there is rain tomorrow and $1
otherwise. The evaluation of such alternatives requires an assessment not only of the
desirability of outcomes (utilities) but also of the likelihoods of the events (probabilities
or their generalizations). For risk, with p = P(E), we often write xpy instead of xEy. In
this case, standard decision theory recommends evaluating a prospect using expected
utility (EU), i.e., probability-weighted average utility. Thus, the EU of 10E1 is
P(E)u(10) + (1−P(E))u(1) (probability (P); utility (u)). Risk aversion (valuing a risky
prospect less than its expected value) is commonly assumed to hold. EU explains risk
aversion using a concave utility function over outcomes—for example, if gaining $100
increases utility by more than half as much as does gaining $200 (assuming u(0) = 0),
then a decision maker should prefer receiving $100 for sure to a prospect that offers a
50-50 chance of receiving $200 or else receiving nothing.
Several empirical findings have challenged the descriptive validity of EU. Allais’
(1953) famous violation of the independence axiom suggests that people do not weight
the utilities by their probabilities. More generally, the assumption of risk aversion is
violated by the commonly observed fourfold pattern of risk preferences: risk aversion
for moderate to high-probability gains and low-probability losses, coupled with risk
seeking for low-probability gains and moderate to high-probability losses (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992). Rabin (2000) showed that moderate risk aversion for small-stake
mixed (gain-loss) gambles at all levels of wealth (assuming a strictly increasing and
concave utility function) implies an implausible level of risk aversion for large-stake
gambles under EU.
Such violations of EU are accommodated by prospect theory (PT), the leading
descriptive model of decision under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Under PT, outcomes are evaluated with respect to a
reference point. We assume for simplicity that the reference point is 0. Utility u is
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strictly increasing and u(0) = 0. Utility further exhibits diminishing sensitivity: marginal
utility diminishes with distance from the reference point, leading to concavity for gains
but convexity for losses. Diminishing sensitivity thus contributes to risk aversion for
gains and risk seeking for losses. The latter goes against conventional wisdom but has
been confirmed empirically. Furthermore, utility u is characterized by loss aversion in
which the function is steeper for losses than gains—typically, this is modeled by
multiplying utility for losses by a coefficient λ>1 (Fig. 1). Loss aversion enhances
risk aversion for mixed prospects that offer the possibility of both gains and losses.
Probabilities are transformed by a weighting function w+ for gains and w− for losses,
both normalized so that w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1, and strictly increasing (Fig. 2). Hence,
under PT, xpy is evaluated by the following: w
+(p)u(x) + [1−w+(p)]u(y), if x ≥ y ≥ 0;
w−(p)λu(x) + [1−w−(p)]λu(y), if x ≤ y ≤ 0; w+(p)u(x) + w−(1−p)λu(y), if x > 0 > y.
Figure 2 illustrates an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. Probability
intervals at the extremes, [0, q] and [1−q, 1], have more impact than equivalent
probability intervals in the middle, [p, p + q], that are bounded away from the lower
and upper endpoints. The underweighting of moderate to large probabilities reinforces
the tendency implied by the S-shaped utility function toward risk aversion for gains and
risk seeking for losses of moderate to high probabilities, but reverses this pattern for
very low probabilities, which are overweighted.
Numerous studies surveyed by Wakker (2010) have confirmed the above qualitative
empirical properties, using choices among simple risky prospects.
3 The description–experience gap
Studies of “decisions from experience” (DFE) employ paradigms in which decision
makers learn characteristics of prospects through sequential sampling of independent
identically distributed realizations (outcomes). Three experimental paradigms (see
Hertwig and Erev 2009) and variants thereof have been used. All involve a choice
between two or more prospects. In the most popular sampling paradigm, people first
sample from the distributions as long as they wish without costs. Once search is
terminated, they decide from which distribution to make a single incentivized draw.
In the full-feedback paradigm, each draw adds to a person’s income, and the decision
u(·)
GainsLosses 0
Fig. 1 Prospect theory utility
function
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maker receives draw-by-draw feedback about both the actual payoff and the forgone
payoff. Finally, the partial-feedback paradigm is identical to the full-feedback para-
digm except that it restricts feedback to the actual payoff.
Comparisons of DFE with DFD under risk reveal a description–experience gap for rare
events (Hertwig and Erev 2009). Figure 3 illustrates this gap using six representative decision
problems. In DFE, people afford rare events less impact than they deserve according to their
objective (but unknown) probabilities, whereas in DFD, people afford rare events more
impact than they deserve according to their objective (and known) probabilities.
Choice patterns in all three experience-based paradigms are surprisingly similar in
the tendency to “underweight” rare events. It should be noted that when all possible
payoffs are identified explicitly (whether or not they are experienced), this reduces the
underweighting of rare events in the sampling paradigm (see Erev et al. 2008; Hadar
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and Fox 2009) though perhaps not in the full-feedback paradigm (see Yechiam et al.
2005).
3.1 What causes the description–experience gap?
Researchers have thus far identified five broad mechanisms that contribute to the
description–experience gap. The first three relate to DFE and choices consistent with
underweighting and neglect of rare events; the final two relate to both DFD and DFE.
3.1.1 Sampling error and sheer unawareness of the rare events’ existence
A world in which all risks are transparent and elicit an appropriate response is
unrealistic given inherent limits to our information, attention, and memory. Thus, we
often cannot help but be unaware of possible rare outcomes that we have forgotten or
not attended to. Similarly, we may sometimes rely on an inaccurate model of a decision
environment as when we estimate financial risks using tools that assume a normal
distribution in non-Gaussian environments (Taleb 2007). Unawareness of rare events
can occur in the DFE sampling paradigm when decision makers rely on small samples
in which they never experience rare events. Such lack of awareness that an outcome is
possible is one mechanism that has been found to contribute to the description–
experience gap in studies using the original sampling paradigm (Hertwig et al. 2004;
Hadar and Fox 2009). Fox and Hadar (2006) argued that when one accounts for
sampling error in Hertwig et al. (2004) so that decisions are analyzed with respect to
sampled probability distributions over outcomes (i.e., what participants actually expe-
rienced) rather than the “objective” probability distributions from which outcomes were
sampled (that were unknown to participants), then choices accord well with PT. This
said, a diminished description–experience gap has been shown to persist when partic-
ipants have ample exposure to rare events or when participants are forced to sample all
possible outcomes in proportion to their objective probabilities (Barron and Erev 2003;
Ungemach et al. 2009). This suggests that additional mechanisms may contribute to
observations of the decision–experience gap (see Gonzalez and Gutt 2011, on instance-
based learning).
3.1.2 Selective reliance on past experiences
In many settings, people behave as if they rely on small samples drawn from their past
experiences, possibly due to limitations of memory (e.g., outcomes that were more
recently experienced; see Hertwig et al. 2004). Thus, decision makers may choose as if
they underweight rare events that they have, in fact, experienced. The importance of
this mechanism emerged in two choice prediction competitions focusing on the full-
and the partial-feedback paradigms (Erev et al. 2010a, b): the winning models in both
competitions implied reliance on small set of past experiences.
3.1.3 Tallying
A factor amplifying the gap concerns the way people search in the sampling paradigm.
Hills and Hertwig (2010) found that participants who frequently switch between
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sampling each prospect (rather than sampling several times from each prospect before
switching) are likely to choose options that win most of the time in round-wise
comparisons. Such comparisons ignore the magnitude of the win (defeat), thus
affording little weight to rare extreme outcomes. In contrast, participants who sample
several times from each prospect before switching are more sensitive to rare extreme
outcomes. Frequent switchers therefore tend to exhibit a pronounced description–
experience gap, whereas infrequent switchers tend to behave more consistently across
these paradigms.
3.1.4 The mere-presentation effect: analogical versus propositional representations
Erev et al. (2008) argued that a mere-presentation effect may contribute to
overweighting in DFD but not in DFE. Specifically, DFD involves propositional
representations—e.g., “32 with probability 0.1; 0 otherwise”—thus putting a more
equal emphasis on outcomes than their objective probabilities warrant. If attention
translates into decision weights, rare and common events’ weights will regress
toward the mean. DFE, in contrast, invoke an analogical representation: for
instance, draws from the aforementioned option could lead to this sequence {0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0}. More attention is allocated to the processing of the
frequent than of the rare events.
3.1.5 Unpacking and repacking
As mentioned previously, even when participants sample an entire distribution of
outcomes without replacement so that there is no sampling error and therefore no
unawareness, they tend to exhibit a diminished but significant description–experience
gap. Moreover, selective reliance on past experiences may not play a role, as explicit
judgments of sampled outcome probabilities tend to be quite accurate (see Ungemach
et al. 2009). Fox et al. (2013) validated the robustness of this finding and argued that
description–experience gap was due to the fact that DFE using the sampling paradigm
“unpack” occurrence of outcomes (and therefore attention afforded to them) in propor-
tion to their objective probabilities (similar to Erev et al. 2008 cited above). Fox et al.
(2013) show that DFD can also be made to resemble decisions from experience if
described outcomes are explicitly unpacked. For example, describing the outcome of a
game of chance in a “packed” manner (e.g., “get $150 if a 12-sided die lands 1–2; get
$0 otherwise”) leads to PT-like preferences. In contrast, “unpacking” the same descrip-
tion using a table of outcomes listed by die roll (e.g., “$150 if the die rolls 1; $150 if the
die rolls 2; $0 if the die rolls 3; $0 if the die rolls 4; etc.”) leads to the opposite pattern of
risk preferences, much like DFE.
Moreover, Fox et al. (2013) show that prompting decision makers to mentally
“repack” events that are sampled from experience (by having participants sample
colored cards and identifying outcomes associated with each color only after sampling
is completed) leads to choices that accord with PT. This result accords with the
aforementioned observation of Hills and Hertwig (2010) that participants who sample
each distribution separately tend toward more PT-like behavior—one presumes that
such sampling facilitates a spontaneous “repacking” of probabilities (i.e., consideration
of overall impressions of the probability of each outcome). One interpretation of these
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results could be that the description–experience gap is not about experience per se but
rather about the way in which information is presented or attended to.
4 Decision under described ambiguity
Evidence for the description–experience gap has relied almost exclusively on
comparisons between DFE paradigms involving sampled experience to DFD
paradigms involving precisely described probability distributions over outcomes
(i.e., decisions under risk). However, because outcome probabilities are gener-
ally ambiguous to decision makers in DFE, it is instructive to compare DFE
with DFD under ambiguity. The presence of ambiguity introduces two compli-
cations to decision weighting under PT. First, decision makers must judge for
themselves the likelihood of events on which each outcome depends. Several
studies suggest that to a first approximation, choices accord well with a two-
stage model (Tversky and Fox 1995; Fox and Tversky 1998; Fox and See
2003) in which the probability weighting function from PT is applied to judged
probabilities of events, consistent with support theory (Tversky and Koehler
1994; Rottenstreich and Tversky 1997). Generally, people tend to overestimate
the likelihood of rare events and underestimate the likelihood of very common
events, which amplifies the characteristic pattern of overweighting and
underweighting in PT. However, studies using the standard sampling paradigm
have typically yielded judged probabilities that are quite accurate (Fox and
Hadar 2006; Ungemach et al. 2009), perhaps due to people’s natural facility
in encoding frequency information (Hasher and Zachs 1984).
Second, the shape of the weighting function can vary with the source of uncertainty,
which is defined as a group of events whose realization is determined by a similar
mechanism and that therefore have similar characteristics (see Tversky and Fox 1995;
Tversky and Wakker 1995; Abdellaoui et al. 2011a). Experimental evidence suggests
that the probability weighting function is systematically affected by specific
characteristics of the decision situation, whereas the curvature of the utility
function is not (Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012). For example, departures from
linear weighting are more pronounced for more emotional consequences such as
an electric shock than for less emotional consequences such as a financial
payment (Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001), and high-stake prospects are evaluated
less optimistically than low-stake prospects (Fehr-Duda et al. 2010). People
typically exhibit aversion to betting on ambiguous events (Ellsberg 1961),
particularly when they feel relatively ignorant or incompetent assessing those
events (Heath and Tversky 1991; Fox and Tversky 1995; Fox and Weber 2002)
although ambiguity seeking is occasionally observed, especially for losses
(Camerer and Weber 1992).
If ambiguous probabilities are weighted more pessimistically than chance
(risky) probabilities, then it stands to reason that prospects will be more
attractive when their probability distributions are precisely known than when
they are sampled from experience. Abdellaoui et al. (2011b) observe such a
difference in elevation of probability weighting functions between DFD under
risk and DFE.
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5 Calibration and estimation
Different assumptions on error structures between DFE and DFD can also contribute to
the description–experience gap. Econometric studies (Ben-Akiva et al. 2012; Wilcox
2008) consider such choice errors. We assume observed preferences between J pairs of
prospects xpy and xq′ y ′. The PT value of xpy, PTδ(xpy), depends on δ, which denotes the
vector of subjective parameters determining (w,u,λ). Here, we assume only gains and
write w = w+. This general notation facilitates applications of a number of techniques to
decision models other than PT.
One way to estimate δ is by minimizing some distance function between, say,
observed certainty equivalents and those theoretically predicted by δ. We may also
minimize the number of observed choices mispredicted by δ. This will usually give a
region of optimal δs.
In a stochastic choice model, an error process is assumed and maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation can be used to estimate δ. One example of error process is the
trembling hand model that assumes that decision makers can get confused, say with
probability π, and choose randomly. The probability of a “wrong” choice then is π/2.
Likelihood is maximized by maximizing the number of correctly predicted choices
agreeing with an aforementioned criterion.
An alternative error process entails that a random and independent, continuously
distributed noise term ε is added to each PT value or that each PT value is multiplied by
a random positive factor. This yields the well-known logit model when ε has an
extreme value distribution. In the additive error case, the decision maker now chooses
xpy over xq′ y ′ with probability
exp
1
σ
PT δ xpy
  
exp
1
σ
PT δ xpy
  þ exp 1
σ
PT δ x
0
qy
0
  ;
where σ>0 denotes the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution. The bigger σ,
the closer we are to random, 50-50, choice. For σ tending to 0, we approximate
deterministic choice. The parameters σ and δ can again be estimated using maximum
likelihood.
Some error models assume that in each choice situation a new PT model is chosen
according to some probability distribution over δ (de Palma et al. 2011). For example,
the exponent in the power (CRRA) utility function may be determined randomly for
each choice. Unlike the foregoing trembling hand or logit models, models directly
estimating the probability distribution over δ do not allow for violations of stochastic
dominance in the data. The resulting likelihood functions are usually more complex,
and estimation requires simulation methods (Train 2009; de Palma and Picard 2010).
Although the aforementioned models focus on parameters at the individual level, the
techniques can also be used to estimate population or group-level parameters.
Heterogeneity of δ can either systematically vary across the population or randomly
vary, as in the random parameter or latent class model (Ben-Akiva et al. 2012). The
random parameter distribution is assumed to be a distribution across a population rather
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than across decision instances of a single individual. The random distribution can be
either continuous or discrete. The discrete case (a latent class choice model) allows one
to estimate segments of the population that have distinctly different decision behaviors.
The resulting model describes both who is likely to be in the segment as well as the
segment-specific behavior (Walker and Ben-Akiva 2011). This could be useful in
capturing different probability weighting functions and loss aversion characteristics
as influenced by the experimental design.
Fox et al. (2013) provide an early econometric estimation of DFE. A common utility
function parameter and error parameter are assumed to apply to DFE and DFD, but a
(single) weighting function parameter could vary across paradigms. Their data accord
well with a stochastic PT model with an inverse S-shaped weighting function for DFD
and a linear weighting function for DFE.
Extending the above error theories from risk to ambiguity is especially desirable for
examining the gap between DFD and DFE. Error theories are yet to be developed for
beliefs in the two-stage model described above, where those beliefs should also capture
learning processes. We consider this to be a promising direction for future research.
6 Conclusions
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from our interdisciplinary discussion of the
description–experience gap in decision under uncertainty. First, a substantial part of the
gap can be explained by sampling error (which can cause sheer unawareness that rare
events could occur) and misplaced faith in Gaussian distributions (which can give rise
to misplaced confidence that rare events are highly unlikely to occur). Second, the way
in which the probability distribution over possible outcomes is learned by a decision
maker matters, and an error theory to characterize this process would help advance our
understanding. Thus, elicitation methods that facilitate allocation of decision makers’
attention to possible outcomes in proportion to respective probabilities of occurrence
(in any sort of analogical fashion) may lead decision makers to weigh probabilities in a
more linear fashion. Third, it is instructive to compare DFE to DFD under ambiguity
(rather than risk), and ambiguity aversion may contribute to the putative description–
experience gap.
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